

Wf K put in missiles

Oct 5, 1987

Hyp: K's tactic (maneuver) was "clever-crazy" —
to keep deployment secret from US public
till after missiles operational, by timing
it so missiles would become op right after election,
and to delay Pres' conclusion that they were present
till soon before election, counting on

DE

1) Pres' unwillingness to reveal the presence
just before election (Houlihan, quoted in below)

2) " " " to stall " " " — about
public presence

3) earlier, Pres' maneuvers of missiles

4) after election, Pres' unwillingness to stall
of missiles

He may not have control on leaks to Repubs from
Intell Com — didn't realize JFK couldn't control leaks!

[Hyp: de Voss to McCone to Keating]

or, on pressure from the Repubs disobey

without the pressure — or, without leaks — would
JFK have — made threats

— revealed deployment 3 weeks before election
or, till after operational?! See PSACM

But the "cheer" approach (which might have worked)
was also "crazy reckless." What if it didn't work?
Did Jones think this through, any more than R thought
through ICG? (or, was encouraged to do so by Pan. or North)?
DPP. (or hopeful rather: look only at benefit.)

[Was very & description a "tactic" to / reflection of
expectation / fear that US might act illegally /
aggressing if missiles were known (to public) which
most undesirable

Hypo on CII

on 17 Oct draft SNIE

E Hyp: low miles of Berlin
[is miles of election]

may have been meant to deter US action on
missiles if & when they were discovered —

by hinting Berlin was hostage for Cuban SSMS

(as JFK believed: but he claimed

to be ready to risk hostages: esp. on

Oct 16 (was he not?)

but until Oct 27 (check Cardin's
play — meant)

i.e. maybe no plan to initiate pressure on Berlin
after SSMS is planned

— as I thought at the time (and JFK?)

and in 1964

this was deterrent: possibly. "Bluff"

yet, once SSMS is planned; if he got any with
it, and effort in NATO was good for SU —
he could have pressured Berlin!

— (Though this would have risked a US
move vs. Cuba! Negotiated here would
work both ways!

and SU would then have a big stake
in Cuba, to be lost! (We could capture
or destroy a large part of his MRBM/IRBM supply!)

CII

6 Feb 89

(bstr 23 Aug 62)

[^{Hyp:} Reason minutes were "unacceptable";
then SAMs (+ Mijs) — but much more, SSMs —
blocked US invasion, by posing unacceptable risks;

here, and to back the out before the became
operational — deadline — because it was last
chance (as well as best excuse, even: not
available later!) to invade,

or to keep open the option of invading
(being gotten the out of air strike, mongoose attack (!)
or trade — not of ^{anti-}invasion pledge, which was
not discussed!

This would be like effort of prospect of
Mijs in 1961 on the deadline for (and, intention to
carry out) Bay of Pigs!

"After Mijs deployed (Cuban pilots), option of
invasion of exiles becomes more costly, risky, difficult
or unavailable. Here, deadline"

Mijs precluded pure — after invasion,
as SSMs " US invasion!

We know, now, 1) there was US intent i, prob for,
invasion option, i never then
(whether to cap mongoose,
or to preclude low buildup

(if latter: SU "deterrent" forces
were potentially inviting attack,
like US ships at Pearl Harbor, plans
at Phils; yet, unlike latter, did
(yet = fast enough to) deter attack,
on thinking not on Cuba.

2) SSMS, operational, were regarded by US as deterrent.

(This prospect could have invited attack — if there was a motivation to invade.

see Taylor memo, May 1962: to win, Moogson and US involvement

(esp after some briefing & troops in Ag;

see 7 Ag memo, CIA)

[Why didn't some describe this help briefly as defense against invasion? Did they?

4th 23 Ag: SO more would signal arrival of another signature

[which MGB, JFK & McN would agree: "parsable" Nitze/VCS would not; esp., as inseparable.

He did believe this in 1961! STalbot

Assume: Do we acknowledge this, in action, docs?

JFK: yes ; MGB, others: no (not yet)

(not this way:
C.S. & Travis)

Thus, a concern of US, was mentioned:

To prevent Cuba from regaining the
means — or effective alliance with SC — that
would block the invasion or airstrike
we were actively, secretly, preparing as an
option and as a threat, a form of pressure
and practicing, as

in Vieng and elsewhere;

a potential culmination to Monguon

(see all the occasions mentioned of McN on Oct 4 —

including US horizontal esc, to protect Berlin;

(saf the carrying out FU targets — which

McN must but was determined not to carry out;

note, even in fall '62 about Berlin!

US

(i.e. because we were concerned about Berlin,
we didn't want our threat of attack on
Cuba blocked — we needed that option!

That was one way, minors in Cuba could
understand our position on Berlin!

Archives: (Did K think of that?)

What was K plan for Berlin? (Trushkin's question)

How did keep mentioning it!

What does Thompson say?!

269-70 Note, in 1987: US still talking of importance of
an agreement — or not — not to involve!

(Involution as a "option," (can we have a right
to choose!)